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COMPUTER SOFTWARE PIRACY:




The development of new technologies, such as photocopying1
and other photography techniques,' has traditionally presented a
substantial challenge to the copyright regime because they facili-
tate the misappropriation of intellectual property.' In recent
See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(National Library of Medicine and the National Institutes of Health did not infringe copy-
right by distributing photocopies of articles from medical journals), aff'd 420 U.S. 376
(1975). See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN AGE OF
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (Ch. 4 at 99 (1987)) [hereinafter OTAI (development of
photocopy machine made it less expensive and easier to reproduce printed material). See
generally M. Nimmer, Photocopying And Record Piracy: Of Dred Scott And Alice In Wonderland,
22 UCLA L. REV., 1052 passim (1975) (criticizing Williams decision); Comment, Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States: Library Photocopying of Copyrighted Materials, 1974 UTAH L. REV.
127 passim (1974) (discussion of photocopying problem). But while it is known that photo-
copying causes some loss to book, magazine and newspaper publishing it is apparently not a
serious threat. This is because copying is time consuming and the resultant copy is cumber-
some and imperfect. OTA at 99.
' See, e.g., Blackmun v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Hustler magazine infringed copyrights on photographs of nude model); Sygma Photo
News, Inc. v. High Soc'y Magazine, 778 F.2d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1985) (retouched photo-
graph of actress Raquel Welch in nude used on cover of Celebrity Skin magazine without
owner's authorization infringed copyright); Vane v. The Fair, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 133, 135-
36 (E.D. Tex.) (plaintiff unsuccessfully sued for infringing use of slides and photographs),
affd, 849 F.2d 186 (1987).
See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984). "[Cjopyright
[law] has developed in response to significant changes in [duplication] technology." Id. "In-
deed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment - the printing press - that
gave rise to the original need for copyright protection." Id. "[Ilnnovations in copying tech-
niques gave rise to the statutory exemption for library copying embodied in the . . . copy-
right law." Id. at 430 n. 11. See also Encyclopaedia Britannica, Etc. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp.
243, 248 n. 2. (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (Copyright Act of 1976 was designed to address issues
raised by rapidly changing technology). See generally W.R. HAWKEN, Reprographic Technology:
Present and Future, in L.H. HATTERY & G.P. BUSH, REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAW
(1964), 39-49 (as copying techniques make copying cheaper, amount of copying increases);
N. Henry, Copyright Information, Technology, Public Policy Part II: Public Policies - In-
formation Technology, 1-17 passim (1976) ("neo-publishing" technologies, such as photo-
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years, however, technologies such as video4 and audio cassette re-
corders, 5 facsimile machines,' personal computers, and satellite8
and cable television,' have made piracy of intellectual property an
even more inexpensive and simple task. Thus, the traditional chal-
lenge that technological innovation has presented to copyright law
copying and computers, motivate copyright owners to demand more extensive copyright
protection); Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Techno-
logical Era, 96 HARV. L. REv. 450, 450-51 (1982) (technological advances give impetus to
changes in copyright laws).
' See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417-18 (5-4 decision determining that use and sale of home video
tape recorders does not constitute copyright infringement); See also Columbia Pictures In-
dus. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 62-63 (3rd Cir. 1986) (video cassette rental business' in-
store performances of copyrighted works was copyright infringement); Peter Starr Prod.
Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1986) (defendant repro-
duced plaintiffs copyrighted motion picture and sold 400 copies in Sweden and the United
Kingdom). But see Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (videotaping commercially broadcasted televi-
sion for viewing in home at a later date was found to be "fair use"); See generally, Note, The
Betamax Case: Accommodating Public Access and Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 243, 243 (1979) (discussion of threat Betamax poses to copyrighted works broad-
casted on television).
' See RCA/Ariola Int'l., Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 780-81 (8th Cir.
1988) (manufacturer and retailer of cassette tape recording machine were vicariously liable
for infringement of record companies copyright); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594
F. Supp. 335, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant used "Rezound" cassette copying machine
to provide customer with copies of plaintiffs pre-recorded tapes); Elektra Records Co. v.
Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 821-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("Make-a-tape" ma-
chine used for pirating copyrighted recordings).
I See OTA, supra note 1 at 107. (transmitting document by facsimile gives rise to new
form of copyright infringement).
" See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 255-58 (5th Cir. 1988) (com-
puter program capable of decoding electronic copyright protection on plaintiffs software);
Telerate Sys., Inc., v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (software program
enabling subscribers to copy information from provider's database constituted contributory
infringement); Atari, Inc., v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 (N.D. I1. 1983)
(PROM-BLASTER device created to copy plaintiffs computer video games). See generally
Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer Software: An Economic Evaluation and
a Proposal for A Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C.L. REV. 977, 980 (1988) (duplication of com-
puter software is easy and cost efficient).
8 See Entertainment & Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Community Ho-
tel, 623 F. Supp. 647, 653-54 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (hotel's unauthorized interception of satel-
lite subscription television programming infringed copyright); National Football League v.
Cousin Hugo's, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 84, 87 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (preliminary judgment granted
to enjoin the unauthorized interception of copyright satellite transmission).
o See Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Sys., 777 F.2d 393, 398-399 (8th
Cir. 1985) (broadcaster alleged that satellite communication company infringed copyright
by retransmitting certain programs into its market), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1005 (1987);
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 623-24 (1982)
(broadcaster alleged that cable TV company infringed copyright by retransmitting pro-
grams without "vertical blanking interval").
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has dramatically intensified."0 This recalcitrant by-product of in-
novation is expected to worsen in the future.1 A forewarning of
the future challenge is revealed by the particular vulnerability of
mass-marketed computer programs.1 2 Computer copying tech-
niques are the most cost efficient form of reprography to date. 13
Moreover, it is contended that the inconvenience and cost of liti-
10 See D. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK, 12-13 (1978) "Congress established CONTU
to study and make recommendations concerning copyright policies as they relate to mod-
ern dataprocessing and reproduction technology." Id. For an early discussion of the
proliferation of reprography techniques and corresponding intellectual property challenges
see L.H. HATTERY & G.P. BUSH, REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1964).
11 See Brown, Copyright Setbacks: Technology Brings Author New Woes, CABLE TV AND NEW
MEDIA LAW & FINANCE, May 1987, 1, 6-7 (new communication technologies have created
additional copy problems); OTA, supra note 1, at 97. In the future optical disk storage
systems may permit a person to collect entire libraries of copyrighted music, videos, books,
magazines and newspapers. Id. Fiber optic technology has the potential to transfer 100
novels over 100 miles in 1 second. Id. Copying, transfer, and manipulation of information
and intellectual works has been made more private by technological advances. Id. See gener-
ally 1.S. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, 226, 226 (1983).
As computers become the printing presses of the twenty-first century, ink marks on
paper will continue to be read, and broadcasts to be watched, but other new major
media will evolve from what are now but the toys of computer hackers. Videodisks,
integrated memories, and data bases will serve the functions that books and libraries
now serve, while information retrieval systems will serve for what magazines and
newspapers do now. Networks of satellites, optical fibers, and radio waves will serve
the functions of the present-day postal system.
Id.
12 See P. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329,
1337 (software exhibits "public goods" problem in that it is difficult to keep those who do
not pay for it from using it, and any additional consumers of the product will not deplete
its supply by their use); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
The Vault court stated:
In 1983 it was estimated that twenty to thirty percent of the computer software
industry's revenues were siphoned off annually by piracy and the unauthorized re-
sale of software. [In 1984 it was estimated] that for every authorized copy of a
software program there is one unauthorized program. Loss from unauthorized cop-
ies was about $1.3 billion from 1981 to 1984, $800 million in 1985, and $800 mil-
lion in 1986.
Id. at 261 n.13; S. BESEN, 261 n.13, Private Copying, Reproduction Costs, And The Supply Of
Intellectual Property, 2 INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY 5, 14 (1986). Producers of busi-
ness software for computers lost revenues of $1.3 billion between 1981-1984 and project
losses of $800 million for 1985. Id. One of five copies of WordStar in the U.S. is legiti-
mate. Id. For every copy of VisiCorp there is at least one pirate copy. Id. Illegal copies
account for about two to nine times the number of copies sold legally. Id. at 14, n. 4.
1" See OTA, supra note 1, at 117. Computers present special problems of piracy because
copying information can be done at a fraction of the cost and in a fraction of the time that
it takes for photocopying or analog and video tape recording. Id. The nature of computer-
mediated information means that an infinite number of perfect copies can be made and
posession of an original copy is not necessary in order to make reproductions of original
quality. Id. Other reproduction techniques are not capable of producing flawless copies. Id.
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gation acts as a significant disincentive to enforcing copyright in
this area. 4 As a result there is a great need for,15 and effort to-
wards providing improved protection for computer programs. 6
Recently, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,' a software
manufacturer argued that by combining legal and technological
protections, a balance could be struck whereby the interests of the
copyright holder and the copy-owner could both be served." The
Fifth Circuit confined their disposition to the legal issues but rec-
ognized in dicta that protection was lacking and that legislative
cognizance of technological methods of protection might indeed
enhance the requisite balance.19
The analysis which follows examines first the competing inter-
ests at work with any form of intellectual property protection and
an overview of the three major protections that have been uti-
lized. These are then considered in the context of computer
software; with emphasis on the copyright protection afforded
software developers and the statutory rights that have been af-
forded software users.
The focus then shifts to electronic devices which have been de-
veloped to protect copyrighted works, and the ability of these pro-
tections to accomodate statutory "fair use", including the software
users' rights. Copyprotection of musical recordings and cable tele-
vision transmissions is examined in order to ascertain the success
with which electronic copyprotection can supplement copyright
without abridging users' rights. Finally, the problem of computer
software piracy is reexamined with a view toward enhanced pro-
tection through a partnership of technology and law.
" See OTA, supra note 1, at 100 (ease with which copyrighted works can be duplicated
by individuals in privacy of their home makes litigation difficult). See generally POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 434-38 (1977) (high transaction cost involved in litigation); SALONE,
How To COPYRIGHT SOFTWARE 175 (1984) (enforcing copyright varies depending on nature
of infringer).
" See supra notes 7, 12-13.
10 See infra notes 53-54, 69, and 130-136. Seegenerally OTA, supra note 1, at 117 nn. 56-
58 (consideration of various software protection methods).
1" 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
18 Id. at 266.
19 Id.
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I. PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The United States Constitution provides that authors and in-
ventors shall have a limited monopoly in the products of their
work. 0 Although the immediate benefits inure to the individual
the economic incentives are intended primarily to benefit the gen-
eral public by stimulating creativity and disclosure."' The laws of
patent, copyright and trade secret are the primary forms used to
define and insure this balance. However, since the potential uni-
verse of such rights literally includes all that can be imagined,
some ideas and expressions are not adequately protected by any
one or any combination of these safeguards.2 2 Additional protec-
tion is derived from contractual licensing agreements2 and from
statutory hybrids which are specifically designed to address the
needs of a particular type of product. 4 In the age of sophisticated
electronics, increasing attempts are made to develop technological
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which provides that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and discoveries."
Id.
" See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Consti-
tution "reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest", and that private
incentives must ultimately secure broad availability of creative works to society as a whole);
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-328 (1858) (limited monopoly was never designed for
exclusive benefit of authors and inventors; benefit to public at large was primary object of
monopoly). See NEITZKE, A SOFTWARE LAW PRIMER, 1-38 (1984) (general public will benefit
if limited monopoly granted to inventor).
' See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
21 See Note, Tear-Me-Open Software License Agreements: A Uniform Commercial Code Perspec-
tive On An Innovative Contract of Adhesion, 7 COMPUTER L. J. 261, 262 (1986). "[A shrink-
wrap license] consists of a printed agreement placed on the outside of a computer diskette
or cassette package ... enabling the potential customer to read the contract without open-
ing the wrapper." Id. See generally Note, Archival Backup Copying of Software: How Broad A
Right?, 14 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY L. J., 391, 396-403 (1988) (main purpose
of shrink-wrap licensing is to avoid transfer of ownership of computer program); Note,
Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REV. 497, 505
(1986) (although courts have not decided whether shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable
they probably will not be upheld); E. KEET, PREVENTING PIRACY: A BUSINESS GUIDE TO
SOFTWARE PROTECIION, 97-109 (1985) (general overview of contract protection regarding
computer software).
2 See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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protection of intellectual property.26 Efforts to protect computer
programs have involved each of these legal and extra-legal
techniques.
A. Patents
A patent is in many respects the most powerful legal protection
available, providing the patentee an exclusive right to make, use
or sell a product for seventeen years,2 6 including protection
against subsequent independent development.17 The touchstones
of a patent are a rigorous requirement of originality28 and an in-
herent utility.29 Thus, the Patent Act of 1952 is construed to pro-
s5 See infra notes 77-79 and 135-136 (discussing technological protection for software);
107-108 (technological protection for digital audio tape machines); 117 (technological pro-
tection used for cable television).
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984). "Every patent shall ... grant to the patentee ... for the term
of seventeen years ... the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the inven-
tion throughout the United States. . ." Id. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969) ("patentee has exclusive right to manufacture, use
and sell his inventions"), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 (1971); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186
U.S. 70, 88-89 (1902) (owner of patent has right to sell or keep patent, manufacture pat-
ented article or license others to manufacture it, or sell article or allow others to sell it).
The patent holder may "sell" his exclusive rights by granting them to another and may at
the same time retain any other rights not conferred. Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 15
(1912).
"' See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (patentee is
within lawful right when excluding others from using patent during statutory period), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); Carson Prods. Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453, 461 (5th Cir.
1979) (patent totally exclusionary for period granted); Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422
F.2d 1290, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970) (patent protects against unlicensed use even where process
is discovered by individual research), af'd, 444 F.2d 1313 (1971).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1984). "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention
was known or used by others . . . or patented or described in a printed publication ...
before the invention thereof by the applicant . . . or (f) he did not himself invent the
subject matter... " Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984). "A patent may not be obtained ... if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains." Id.
On the requirement of first inventorship, see, e.g., Alexander Milburn Co., v. Davis
Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1925) (there may be two original inventions only
earlier filed patent may establish prior knowledge or invention); In re Frilette, 412 F.2d
269, 274 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (statute gives right of patent to first inventor). On the require-
ment of non-obviousness, see, e.g., Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Sup.
Co., 332 F.2d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 1964) (patent lacks invention if it is obvious), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 888 (1964); In re Lechene, 277 F.2d 173, 177 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (patent cannot be
obtained if subject matter is obvious to those having skill in the art to which the subject
matter pertains).
' 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984). "Whoever invents any . . . new and useful process ... may
obtain a patent therefor .... " Id. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-529
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vide patent protection to a sufficiently novel and nonobvious pro-
cess that utilizes a computer" but not to computer software itself
which, though an item of great utility, is more akin to a literary
expression.31 Therefore, although the first computer programs
were patented, today patents are not well suited for most mass-
marketed software.$2
B. Copyrights
Copyrights are counterparts to patents in that while a patent
protects an idea (as embodied in a useful product), a copyright
protects the expression of ideas.3 3 The expression must be an
(1966) (only that which is useful can be patented); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192,
200 (1882) (patent law rewards those who advance useful arts). It is contended that the
utility requirement does not insist that the invention is more effective than previous prod-
ucts but, rather, that it is operable to the extent of the useful function assigned to it. Com-
pare Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1339 (5th Cir.)
(product of patented process is useful if it serves identifiable purpose beyond being end
product of chemical reactions, without regard to commercial viability), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1014 (1980) with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 156, 162-163
(Ct. Cl. 1982) (inadequate computer simulation not reduction to practice and not protected
though useful in subsequent development of operable product).
'o Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981) (upholding patentability of process
which used computer programmed to receive temperature data to determine optimal time
to remove rubber from a press and which automatically opened press at determined time).
The court viewed the claim as a process for curing rubber rather than an application of a
well known mathematical formula. Id. at 191-92. But see Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(there is nothing in patent application that suggests anything unusual about temperature
reading devices).
" See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-596 (1978) (denying patent protection to pro-
gram designed to calculate an "alarm limit" for use in connection with widely known cata-
lytic conversion process); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-73 (1972) (denying patent
protection to program which converted binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary
form). See generally R. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 2.05 (1985) (subject
matter requirement makes patentability of computer program unlikely); Note, Combating
Software Piracy: A Statutory Proposal To Strengthen Software Copyright, 34 DE PAUL L. REV.
993, 1004-1005 (1985) (reconciliation of case law demonstrates that software programs not
within patent protection).
8 Diamond, 450 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (well established principles of patent
law prevent issuance of patent to almost any conceivable computer program). "[D]irect
attempts to patent programs have been rejected on the ground of nonstatutory subject
matter. Indirect attempts... by drafting claims as process.., should not be permitted,...
[rleliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous volume of
prior art being generated." Id. (quoted in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)).
The "mental steps" doctrine excludes processes involving mental operations from patenta-
ble subject matter. See, e.g., Diamond at 195; In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794-95 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a-b) (1977). "Copyright protection subsists .... in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... In no case does copyright
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original one which is fixed in a tangible form." Copyright origi-
nality is satisfied by any work of original authorship without re-
gard to the uniqueness or merit of the expression. 5 A "tangible"
medium includes both that which is directly perceivable and that
which can be perceived with the aid of a machine.3
Computer software is protected under the Copyright Act."'
Conceptually, it is the most appropriate protection for the expres-
sion embodied on software," but because software is also a utilita-
rian item, problems arise in defining what is protected and which
uses of software should be permitted? Furthermore, because
software is especially susceptible to copying, the protection of
protection .. extend to an idea .. regardless of the form in which it is described .... "
Id. See also Welles v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 308 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1962).
"[I]deas per se are not copyrightable .. " Id. Thus, an author may borrow another's idea
though expressed in a copyrighted form. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954)
(form rather than mechanical or utilitarian aspects of artistic item protected). See also
Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F.Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981) (copyright on
ASTEROIDS video game was not infringed by game METEORS which borrowed idea of
shooting at space rocks and enemy spaceships while avoiding contact with either).
" See supra note 33.
See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 824
(11 th Cir. 1982) (element of originality is essential in order to copyright work); Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (constitution and statute
require that author's contribution be more than "merely trivial" it must be "his own"). See
generally R. NiMMER, COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (1981) (discussing general qualifications for ob-
taining copyright protection).
17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (1977). "... [Flixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id. Prior to 1909,
the fixation of expression had to be in a form directly perceivable by humans. See White-
Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1908) (perforated piano rolls held not
to be copies of compositions because they could not be visually perceived).
-1 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1988). "Defining a computer program for purposes of the
Copyright Act as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." Id. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5667 ("literary works
... includes ... computer programs"); see, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer program is 'literary work'
within meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101 regardless of whether in source or object code), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. See also, CONTU Report, infra note 53,
at 11.
39 Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (holding that designer lamps were copy-
rightable because design separable from lamp). But cf. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796, 806 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (artistic contemporary design for outdoor lighting held un-
copyrightable), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
The permissible uses of software, as laid out in § 117, are a by-product of the general
incompatibility of utilitarian objects and the copyright laws. See infra note 61.
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copyright, though appropriate, is often not effective.40
C. Trade Secrets
A trade secret protects particular information, processes and
designs which give a business a competitive advantage. "1 The most
significant element of a trade secret is that it is in fact a secret, at
least to the extent that it would be difficult to acquire the infor-
mation except through improper means."2 This implies both a re-
quirement that the information was developed through substantial
effort and that measures are taken to protect its secrecy.' 3 These
aspects of the secrecy component render the protection inappro-
10 See supra notes 7, 10-14 and infra notes 133-35.
"I See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939), which provides that "[a] trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." Id. See, e.g., Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding &
Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 257, 213 A.2d 769, 778 (1965) (like patents, a trade secret
must be novel to be protected). See Wilken v. Sunbeam Corp., 377 F.2d 344, 346-47 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967). On the other hand, a trade secret need not involve
a substantial element of inventiveness; it is sufficient that the process or information is
original in the copyright sense. Cf Town and Country House and Home Servs., Inc. v.
Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 317, 189 A.2d 390, 393 (1963) (customer lists may be trade secrets);
Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 512, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958) (although compo-
nents of trade secret are widely available, their successful combination may be protected).
See generally NIMMER, supra note 35, at § 3.04 (discussing scope of trade secret subject mat-
ter requirements).
In the context of computer software, a trade secret often consists of a particular combi-
nation of well known processes for a commercial purpose. See, e.g., Motorola Inc. v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173, 1186 (D. Ariz. 1973) (trade
secrets revealed in product, fully disclosed in patents, generally known to those skilled in
trade, or easily acquired by persons in industry through patents, literature or known
processes). See also Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) (though existing systems contained similar concepts, functions and common
base they differ as to combination and design employed), affd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir.
1972).
4 Compare Bowser, Inc. v. Filters, Inc., 398 F.2d 7, 9-10 (9th Cir. 1968) (not misappro-
priation where defendant learned of trade secret from general commercial sources and
independent deduction) with Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 435-436 (9th Cir.
1975) (misapproprition where trade secret information obtained through unsuccessful ne-
gotiation and independent deduction).
41 See, e.g., Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 102, 208 A.2d 74,
82-84, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965). The relative amount of secrecy required varies
with the circumstances. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRET ACT § 1 (trade secret protected so long
as there are "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to protect its secrecy.").
Compare Dickerman Assocs. v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co., 594 F. Supp. 30, 34 (D. Mass.
1984) (written confidentiality agreement appropriated) with Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video
Center, Inc. 478 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (oral instructions regarding confi-
dentiality appropriate).
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priate in most mass-marketed software contexts because the func-
tions and structures of programs are generally apparent to skilled
users." While contractual licensing arrangements can, with great
success, supplement trade secret protection in some situations, the
cost of implementing and enforcing such arrangements is prohibi-
tive for application to most computer software.45
D. Sui Generis Protections
The scope of protection afforded intellectual property through
patent, copyright and trade secret law, although extensive, is not
complete.46 Certain products do not fit neatly into any of the safe-
guards, but Congress has been reluctant to tailor new categories
of protection.47 On occasion, however, a hybrid is deemed desira-
ble to address the needs of a particular product. In 1984, such
protection was provided for mask works on semi-conductor
chips48 and a strong argument has been made that a similar ap-
" NIMMER, supra note 35, at § 3.01. Once marketed, the "secrets" of a computer pro-
gram are generally apparent to users with technical skill. Id. Moreover, in an environment
where skilled employee mobility and entrepreneurship are common, such as in the com-
puter industry, secrecy is difficult to maintain. Id.
" See M. Gilburne, "The Proprietary Rights Pyramid: An Integrated Approach To Copyright
and Trade Secret Protection for Software," 1 The Computer Lawyer, 2-9 (1984). For example,
licensing agreements to supplement trade secret protection for basic software, such as a
typical spreadsheet program, would not be economically sound because, due to the large
number of copies sold the relatively low price of the software, and the availability of alter-
native products, a licensing agreement would be difficult to enforce and would create a
disincentive to purchase. Id. On the other hand, "vertical market" software, such as a sys-
tem to handle airline reservations, has relatively few customers, a relatively high price, and
generally would involve detailed contractual arrangements apart from trade secret mainte-
nance therefor involving minimal marginal cost and disincentives to purchase. Id.
40 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (discoveries of principles of
nature are excluded from patent protection); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1966) (mathematical formulae not protected); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112-113
(1853) (holding that while Morse could patent use of electromagnetism to produce tele-
graphic signals, he could not for electromagnetism "however developed"). See generally
Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property - Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law
to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REv. 471, 490 (1985) (discussing "gaps" between patent
and copyright law).
"' See Samuelson, supra note 46, at 472-74. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984 was the first new federal intellectual property law in over 100 years. N.Y. Times, Oct,
1984 at 1, col. 4. Cf. CONTU Report, infra note 53, at 6. The majority of CONTU com-
missioners decided against recommending enactment of a special law; they support the en-
actment of an amendment to the existing copyright law to include protection of computer
programs. Id.
48 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, PuB. L. No. 98-620, tit III, 98 Stat. 3347
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proach should be adopted for software. 49 Many practical consider-
ations advise against special legislation,6" however, it is submitted
that any future changes in the legal protection afforded software
will occur within the framework of the copyright laws.
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SOFTWARE
Computer programs were first registered with the copyright of-
fice in 196461 and were classified as "books" for purposes of the
Copyright Act.8 2 A decade later Congress established the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) to research issues related to comprehensive revisions of
the copyright law as it applied to computer software. 5 In 1976,
before CONTU submitted its final recommendations, Congress
amended the Copyright Act to bring computer programs within
its protections.5 It took subsequent case law, however, to deter-
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. 1988)).
'9 See Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Act of Dec. 12, 1980, PUB. L. No. 96-
517 § 10, 94 stat. 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117) (1977)); Samuelson, supra note
46, at 507-531. The most compelling reasons for sui generis protection for software stem
from its utilitarian nature and the ineffectiveness of copyright laws in providing protection
or establishing limitations on protection. Id.
" See Id. at 481-484. Among the principal practical considerations are the history of
expanding existing bodies of intellectual property law thereby securing a wealth of legal
precedents, including stability with regard to international protection. Id. See also S. REP.
No. 425, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. at 12 (1984) ("Copyright system is not only adequate, but
well suited to task at hand.").
"1 See Bigelow, The Challenge of Computer Law, 7 W. NEW ENG. LAW REV. 397, 401 (com-
puter programs were given "benefit of the doubt" and allowed to be registered for copy-
rights as "literary works"). See generally COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR, 31 COPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCH) P 15023 (March 1977).
"' See D. BROOKS & M. KEPLINGER, COMPUTER PROGRAMS & DATA BASES: PERFECTING, PRO-
TECTING & LICENSING PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AFTER THE 1980 COPYRIGHT AMENDMENTS 152
(1981); F. COOPER, LAW AND THE SOFTWARE MARKETEER 35 (1988).
" See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, [hereinafter CONTUI 20 (1978), reprinted in substantial part, 3 Com-
puter L. J. 53 (1981). CONTU's members were appointed by the President and were to
include authors, people who used the copyright material and the general public. Id. The
commission stated in part that:
CONTU was created to provide the President and Congress with recommendations
concerning those changes in copyright law or procedure needed both to assure pub-
lic access to copyrighted works used in conjunction with computer and machine du-
plication systems and to respect the rights of owners of copyrights in such works,
while considering the concerns of the general public and the consumer.
Id. at 1.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1978 & Supp. 1988); See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
54, reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5667 (" '[L]iterary works' . ..
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mine that copyright protected both source and object code, 5
video display, 6 the sequencing of a program57 and ROM chips."
In 1978, CONTU issued its final report59 concluding that copy-
right protection is needed for computer programs in order to pro-
mote their production," but recommended that the Act be
includes . . .computer programs.") 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. 1988). This section
defines literary works as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, num-
bers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the mate-
rial objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks or
cards in which they are embodied." Id.; Bender, Software Protection: The 1985 Perspective, 7
W. NEW ENG. L. REV., 405, 420 (1985) (stating CONTU's proposals were incorporated as
recommended in Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980). See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976); Act of Oct. 19, 1976, PuB. L. No. 94-553, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (90 Stat.) 2541. The amendment came as a response to the "wide range of
new techniques for capturing and communicating printed matter, visual images, and re-
corded sounds [that] have come into use, and the increasing use of information storage and
retrieval devices, communications satellites, and laser technology .. " H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659,
5660. The Court in Vault agreed with CONTU's recommendation that there should be
limitations imposed so that only those individuals in rightful possession of the program
copies are freely able to use them without fear of copyright infringement. Vault, 847 F.2d
at 260.
08 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-1250 (3d Cir.
1983) (affirming copyrightability of software as application programs, operating programs,
in either object or source code or embodied in ROM for first time), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984).
" See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (court found that
images and sounds from game screen qualify for copyright protection as audiovisual work);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (copyright protected
audiovisual aspect of game).
87 Whelan Assoc. Inc. v. Jaslow, 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3rd Cir. 1986) (copyright protec-
tion extends to "structure, sequence and organization" of software program), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987); SAS Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp.
816, 831 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (conclusion of infringement based on copying of organization
and structural details). But see Plains Cotton Cooperative Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer
Service, Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting Whelan), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
80 (1987).
" See William Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3rd Cir. 1982) (com-
puter ROM chip is copyrightable); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (copying of ROM chip violated 1976 Copyright Act).
B' See CONTU, supra note 53.
48 See CONTU, supra note 53, at 11. The Commission concluded that copyright protec-
tion is necessary for computer programs. Id. But see id. at 27. (Commissioner Hersey, dis-
senting) (copyright protection is unnecessary). "In all the months of its hearings and inquir-
ies, this Commission has not been given a single explicit case of a computer 'rip-off' that
was not amenable to correction by laws other than copyright." Id. at 30; Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 781 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citing Comissioner Hersey, also dissenting in CONTU report, recommending
limited protectability for computer programs); CONTU, supra note 53, at 26. (Commis-
sioner Nimmer, concurring) (the proposed law is too broad and becomes general missap-
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amended to permit the "rightful possessor" of a program to back-
up and or adapt a program."' Congress enacted CONTU's pro-
posed amendments with only one change in the language."2
propriation law). "[lIt may prove desirable to limit copyright protection for software to
those computer programs which produce works which themselves qualify for copyright
protection." Id. at 27. See generally R. STALLMAN, GNU EMACS MANUAL 175-84 (1st ed.
1985) (cited in Walters, Defining The Scope of Software Copyright Protection For Maximum Pub-
lic Benefit, 14 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY L. J., 1, 3 n.13 (1988)) (arguing against
extending copyright to computer software); S. Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 340-350
(1970) (proponents of copyright for computer software do not make convincing case).
" CONTU, supra note 53, at 13. The report states that:
One who rightfully possess a copy of a program, therefore, should be provided with
a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its use by that possessor. This
would include the right to load it into a computer and to prepare archival copies of
it to guard against destruction or damage by mechanical or electrical failure.
Id.; see Note, Rutgers supra note 23, at 392. The right to make back up copies is "essential
because electronically stored information" is especially vulnerable to destruction in many
ways. Id. "[A] user is at least somewhat negligent if he does not make copies of his pro-
grams." Id. "[There are] two reasons [for this] 1) one cannot see by visual inspection if a
program is intact; and 2) operator error or program 'glitches' can quickly destroy a pro-
gram." OTA, supra note 1, at 102 n. 14. (citing personal communication from Edward
Conklin, Forth, Inc., July 23, 1985). Computer programs can easily be destroyed by a num-
ber of environmental factors such as a speck of dust, smoke, a minor scratch, or bending
the floppy disk. (Telephone Interview with Jonathan Thaler, Systems Programmer and An-
alyst, CBS Records (Oct. 13, 1988)). However, making archival copies would probably be
held an act of copyright infringement because it involves making a "fixed" reproduction of
the work. Stern, Section 117 Of The Copyright Act: Charter of The Software User's Rights Or An
Illusory Promise? 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459, 466 (1985). It can be argued that back-up
copying is a "fair-use" of the copyrighted work. Id. Recent cases have rejected the premise.
See, e.g., Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
450 (D.C. Idaho 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F.Supp. 33 (D.C.Mass. 1984).
17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. 1988) ("rightful possessor" was changed to "owner"). This
section states that:
[N]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106 ([17 U. S. C. § 106]), it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize
the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in
no other manner, or
(2) that such a new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer
program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be
leased, sold or otherwise transferred along with the copy from which such copies
were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the
program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of
the copyright owner.
Id. [emphasis added]. CONTU proposed that computer programs would be considered
within the parameters of copyright provided that "they contained sufficient original au-
thorship . . . they had published, and . . .copies submitted for registration were in human
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By granting software consumers the right to adapt or back-up
their program, section 117 appeared to define the scope of copy-
right protection for software. s However, as is the case in most
copyright contexts, litigation is economically feasible only in cases
involving commercial infringement. As a result, judicial interpre-
tations of section 117 are sparse. The cases in which it has been
an issue involved commercial infringement and in most of these
the defendant was charged with contributory infringement" for
developing and marketing a product that enables others to violate
the plaintiff's copyright.6 5 The defense in these cases attempts to
justify the defendants' activities as legitimate under section 117,
claiming that the alleged infringements are designed to enable
readable form." CONTU supra, note 53, at 15. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1988)
(computer program is "a set of instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result.").
The CONTU report is considered by the courts to represent the legislative history of §
117. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1988) The
Act's legislative history, contained in a committee report, merely states that the Act, "em-
bodies the recommendations of [the CONTU] with respect to clarifying the law of com-
puter software." Id. at 260 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1307 96th Cong. 2d Sess., Pt.1, at 23,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6460, 6482). See also Formula, 725 F.2d
at 524 (CONTU report was adopted almost verbatim by Congress); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A
Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Il1. 1983) (CONTU Report used to ascertain legisla-
tive intent behind § 117); Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 35 n.7 (CONTU Report represents
the entire legislative history behind § 117); Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 750 n. 6. (same).
63 See supra note 62 (section 117 of Copyright Act sets out in detail protections pro-
vided). CONTU's rationale for enacting section 117 was to allow those who own copies of
programs to place them in their computers without the risk of infringement. Contu supra
note 53, at 13. CONTU urged that section 117 also to allow owners to make the necessary
adaptations so that a generic computer program can be adapted to an individual user's
computer. Id.
" See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). Contributory in-
fringement lies when the defendant sells a product with constructive knowledge that the
customer may use the equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted works. Id.
The product cannot be capable of "substantial noninfringing uses." Id. at 442. Cf. 35
U.S.C. § 271(b). The statute designates anyone who "actively induces infringement of a
patent" to be an infringer. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (imposes liability on "contributory"
infringers).
6 See Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 451 (marketing of product designed to enable own-
ers to upgrade programs to greater capacity); Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 741 (marketing mod-
ification program designed to complicate program for PAC-MAN video game); Atari, 597
F. Supp. at 5 (marketing device for duplication of copyrighted video games). For examples
of direct commercial infringement without a charge of contributory infringement, see
Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 33 (marketing of programs in diskette form to owners of pro-
gram in print form); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) (marketing of operating program on ROM-chip in violation of license), aff'd,
725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). See generally Bender, supra note 54, at 468-78 (discussing
development of case law under section 117).
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software owners to exercise their statutory rights to adapt or
back-up their programs.66 Under the rule articulated in Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,6 a substantial legitimate use of a
product will justify its production in spite of the fact that it may
also enable significant copyright infringement.66
In an effort to uphold some form of copyright protection for
software manufacturers, courts have rejected the defense by giv-
ing a narrow construction to section 117.69 In some situations,
however, this construction may have the practical effect of provid-
ing unequal protection for similarly situated software owners. For
example, some software owners may find that they cannot avail
themselves of outside help to adapt their programs, 0 others may
find their right to copy limited to making only RAM copies 7 1 and
others may be able to copy a program only where they can prove
their medium is subject to mechanical or electrical failure.7
The right to adapt a program is, arguably, less susceptible to
concrete legal parameters than its statutory counterpart of archi-
val copying since it can take many different forms involving a wide
range of activity. 3 The principal difficulty, then, from the point
See, e.g., Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 456-57 (defendant argued that § 117 legiti-
mized its activities); Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 744-745 (same); Atari, 597 F. Supp. at 9 (court
rejected applicability of § 117); Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 34 (IS & A invoked § 117 as a
defense); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 619 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (contempt proceeding).
01 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 440-56 (finding that Betamax capability of "commercially significant non-in-
fringing uses" was dispositive on issue of actionable contributory infringement).
"' See, e.g., RAV Communications, Inc. V. Philipp, Bros., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 33676
(S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1988) (LEXIs, Genfed library, Dist file) (statute should be given narrow
construction).
"0 See Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 456 (Hubco could not avail itself of the "owner"
exception the implication being that an "owner" with enough technical expertise could
avail itself of exception and make adaptation); Micro-Sparc, 592 F.Supp. at 34-35. (without
purchasing second copy, only owners willing to input program manually could obtain it in
diskette form).
"' Apple, 594 F. Supp. at 620 (necessity to make copy exists only while program is in
operation); Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 34-35. (users may only input program in RAM-
chip).
" Atari, 597 F. Supp. at 9 (right to make archival copy limited to when there is threat of
damage by mechanical or electrical failure).
"' See, e.g., RAV Communications, Inc., v. Philipp, Bros., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 33676
(S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1988) (LExis, Genfed library, Dist file) (extent of adaptation permissi-
ble under statute to be determined); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 746
(N.D. I1. 1983) (finding.of infringement based on copying not adaptation).
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of view of a court interpreting this right, is to distinguish between
adaptations which were within the purview of the statutory aims
and those which, if allowed, would usurp the protections which
copyright holders may legitimately expect."4 The right to make
archival copies, on the other hand, involves a very specific activity
and one which is analogous to many other copyrighted products.
The principle difficulty is merely one of enforcement since the
same technology which enables this right to be exercised enables
infringement to occur. Faced with such a scenario, a court is
bound under Sony to allow infringement-enabling technology to
be produced and marketed.7 5
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd. ,7 Vault, a computer
software manufacturer, developed an electronic copyprotection it
called PROLOK, which was designed to prevent unauthorized re-
production of copyrighted software." The operational aspect of
PROLOK was called a "fingerprint". 7 8 A copy of a program made
from the PROLOK diskette would not contain the fingerprint and
a computer could not operate the copied program.7 9 Quaid devel-
oped a system for software reproduction called CopyWrite.80
CopyWrite contained a feature called RAMKEY which was
designed to unlock the fingerprint, thus enabling copies of
PROLOK diskettes to be operational."
Vault asserted that Quaid's product violated the Copyright
74 Compare CONTU, supra note 53, at 13 (right to make adaptation justified in a discus-
sion of computer user's legitimate interest in using software) with RAV Communications,
Inc. v. Philipps Brothers, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 33676 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1988) (LExIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (CONTU list is not exhaustive and an inquiry into scope and purpose of
adaptation is required). See also Midway, 564 F. Supp. at 745 (where defendant concedes
that statutory exception of 17 U.S.C. § 109, which deals with owner's right to resell or
display original copy, should not be strained so as to justify modification kit).
" Cf. supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
"7 Id. at 256.
71 Id. A PROLOK diskette is comprised of two parts: the fingerprint and the software
program. Id. The fingerprint is a small mark physically placed on the diskette and contains
information that cannot be altered or erased. Id.
19 Id. The PROLOK programs interact with the fingerprint preventing a computer from
operating unless it identifies the original diskette in the disk drive. Id.
o Id. at 257. Quaid first developed CopyWrite featuring RAMKEY in response to the
original PROLOK diskette and has revised it corresponding to the updated versions of
PROLOK. Id. at 257-58.
81 Id. at 257. Essentially, RAMKEY informs the computer that the fingerprinted original
is in the disk drive. Id.
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Act 2 alleging, inter alia,88 that Quaid was guilty of contributory
infringement by producing a product that enabled computer users
to misappropriate copyrighted programs.8 Quaid successfully de-
fended, arguing that since section 117 permitted an owner to
make archival copies of programs, RAMKEY had a substantial
non-infringing use and thus did not violate Vault's copyrights.8"
Therefore, even though RAMKEY also has the capacity to facili-
tate infringement, 6 and CopyWrite derives its primary commer-
cial value from its ability to facilitate reproduction of copypro-
tected programs,' because statutory non-infringing uses were also
facilitated by RAMKEY, its validity and legality remain
unchecked.88
Recognizing the archival copy exception and the underlying
policy considerations for protecting users' rights against the mo-
nopoly created for copyright holders, Vault asserted that their
product represented a means to better satisfy the difficult balance
required of intellectual property protection. 9 It claimed that own-
ers of PROLOK software could make archival copies sufficient to
protect against mechanical or electronic failure which it asserted
were the concerns to which the archival exception was ad-
dressed.90 The court acknowledged the appeal of this possible
" Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1988).
8" Id. In addition to the claim of contributory infringement, Vault asserted that Quaid's
activities were actionable on four other grounds: (1) that by loading the PROLOK pro-
gram into the memory of their computer, Quaid violated §§ 501(a) and 106(1) of the
Copyright Act; (2) that the second and latest version of RAMKEY contained a sequence of
approximately 30 characters of source code which was identical to a portion of PROLOK's
source code, and as such constituted a derivative work within the meaning of the Copyright
Act; (3) that by decompiling Vault's program, Quaid violated a Louisiana statute providing
for enforcement of shrink-wrap licensing agreements; (4) that the misappropriation vio-
lated the Lousiana Uniform Trade Secret Act. Id.
" Id. For a discussion of contributory infringement see supra note 64 and accompanying
text. See also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-442 (1984)
(background discussion of contributory infringement).
Vault, 847 F.2d at 259, 261-262.
"Id.
I1 d. at 258. (Quaid testified that without RAMKEY feature, CopyWrite would have no
commercial value).
I ld. at 262.
so Id. at 266. For a discussion of the requisite balance in general terms, see supra note 21.
'0 Vault, 847 F.2d at 266. Vault demonstrated in court that the systems program re-
corded on PROLOK disks could be copied and stored, affording the owner protection
against erasures to the extent that if the original was damaged due to electronic or
mechanical failure, an archival copy of the program could be used to replace it on the
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merging of statutory and technological copy-protection but felt
compelled to dispense with the case in accordance with the cur-
rent statutory provisions.9 In doing so, the court suggested that
the argument should be addressed to the legislature in order to
effectuate a better balance of the competing interests."2
As indicated, misappropriation of computer software is ram-
pant.9" Other industries, such as cable television and the record-
ing industry, face similar problems due to the ease with which
copies can be made and the relative unenforceability of the laws
protecting copyrights.9 In each of these industries efforts have
been made to protect copyright holders through extra-legal de-
vices95 and through the incorporation of technological safeguards
into statutory schemes.9 ' In spite of the limited success in this re-
gard, the gravity of the problem and the difficulty associated with
its resolution indicate that further attention to a merger of legal
and technological protection of intellectual property is warranted
and, consequently, forthcoming.97
III. THE RECORDING INDUSTRY: ADVENT OF DIGITAL AUDIO TAPE
OPENS UP CONGRESSIONAL DIALOGUE
The recording industry, like the computer industry, is vulnera-
ble to misappropriation of intellectual property because the ability
to copy recordings is easily accomplished through unauthorized
tape recording.98 Unlike the computer industry, however, home
original PROLOK disk. Id. The court found the words "mechanical and electronic" failure
as used in the CONTU report illustrative rather than exclusive. Id. at 266-67. But see Atari,
Inc. v. JS & A, 597 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no evidence that programs stored in
ROM chips could be damaged by mechanical or electrical failure, archival exception does
not apply). See also Micro-Sparc, Inc v. Amtype Corp. 592 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (D.C. Mass.
1984) (archival exception does not apply to copying and selling programs which only ap-
pear in printed magazine format).
91 Vault, 847 F.2d at 266. The court stated that "it is not our job to apply laws that have
not been written." Id. (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417,
456 (1984)).
92 Vault, 847 F.2d at 261 n.13 (summary of extent of computer software piracy).
" See supra note 12.
See infra notes 98, 100 and 112.
9' See infra notes 108 and 117 and accompanying texts.
" See infra notes 107-109 and 120-121.
97 Cf supra text accompanying note 19. But c.f Mace Utilities versim 4.10C (1985-87)
(discussing potential dangers to software arising from technological protection).
" See OTA, supra note 1, at 100. ("By 1982, 52 percent of Americans over the age of
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taping technology has generally involved diminution in quality
from the original to the copy. 9 In spite of this, the recording in-
dustry asserts that it loses large amounts of money each year
through taping, °00 and it has consistently lobbied for enhanced
protection. 10' With the advent of digital recording and digital au-
dio tape (DAT) for home use, misappropriated copies are now of
the same fidelity as the originals the industry markets.0 2
Like computer software, musical compositions, whether embod-
ied on paper or phonorecords, derive their principle protection
from the Copyright Act.'03 Moreover, the relative unenforceabil-
ity of the protection with respect to non-commercial infringement
is prohibitive of litigation in these contexts. 0 4 The industry has
attempted to secure additional protection in a variety of ways.
Legislative compromises, such as a blank tape tax, have been una-
ble to overcome resistance from consumer groups and blank tape
manufacturers.0 5 Although the industry successfully secured the
13 had used audio tape machines within the previous two years to record phonograph
records and other materials."). See also supra note 5.
" See OTA, supra note 1, at 102.
100 Id. at 100. Surveys conducted by the International Federation of Phonogram and
Videogram Producers indicate that one of four recordings sold worldwide and one of ten
sold in the United States is a pirate copy. DiMauro, Disk, Tape Piracy at 25% Level: Report
Shows Some Countries Fight Back, Variety, July 31, 1985 at 1, 92. Evidence collected for the
Recording Industry Association of America suggested that in 1982 the industry sustained
losses of more than $1.4 billion in sales. OTA at 101. A recent study conducted in Canada,
commissioned by the Music Copyright Action Group asserted that the industry was losing
$600,000,000 (Canadian) due to unauthorized copying, an amount "equal to current
sales." Lapointe, Canada Study: Copying is Rampant, Billboard, March 19, 1988 at 1, col. 3.
But see, BESEN, ECONOMIC ISSUES RELATING TO NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY at 47-48 (1986) (these studies may grossly overestimate actual harm suffered by musi-
cal recording copyright proprietiors).
10 Cf infra notes 106-108.
102 See OTA, supra note 1, at 102.
'0 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1977) ("Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of a
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the follow-
ing: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in .. .phonorecords; . . . (3) to distribute copies
or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease or lending; . . ."). See also White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 15 (1908) (musical compositions have been subject of copyright
protection since 1831).
104 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
100 See 132 CONG. REC. S7498 (daily ed. June 13, 1986) (statement of Senator Mathias)
(tape tax provision eliminated from proposed Home Audio Recording Bill). Sales of blank
audiocassette tapes in the United States exceeded $336 million in 1986. '86 Blank Tape
Sales Surge, Billboard, July 18, 1987, at 6, col. 1. A recent attempt to enact a blank tape tax
in England was defeated by a vote of 134-37. Hennessey, U.K. Commons Rejects Tape Levy,
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passage of a record rental bill, the protection it provides is piece-
meal at best; and does not address large-scale commercial
infringers."0 6
The introduction of DAT recorders into the United States has
been successfully delayed through industry-wide efforts to secure
legal protection against what is perceived to be the most signifi-
cant threat to the industry's copyright protection to date.1 07 Until
recently, these efforts have centered around the CBS Copycode
system which would have legislatively required that all DAT re-
corders sold in the United States be equipped with an anti-copying
chip. 0 8 This movement came to an impasse in the spring of 1988
when the National Bureau of Standards, commissioned by Con-
gress to test the system, found that the Copycode system altered
the sound reproduction of the machines and that it could be easily
bypassed.109  Although unsuccessful, the debate surrounding
Copycode evidenced a congressional willingness to incorporate
technological protections into a statutory provision. Although
other technological and marketing strategies have been sug-
gested, 10 and although the Recording Industry Association of
America has threatened to sue any hardware manufacturer who
attempts to sell DAT recorders in the United States,1 it is sub-
Billboard, August 6, 1988 at 1, col. 3. Blank tape taxes have already been enacted in
France, West Germany and Portugal, and have been proposed in Spain, Belgium, Italy and
the Netherlands. Robertshaw, Blank Tape Tax Levy Included in U.K. Copyright Reform, Bill-
board, July 11, 1987 at 1, col. 1, 74, col. 4.
I" See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1977 & Supp. 1988). A renewal of the bill has passed both
houses of Congress. Holland, Record Rental Bill Is Expected to Become Law, Billboard, August
13, 1988 at 7, col. 1.
107 See 133 CONG. REc. E.714 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1987) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (dis-
cussing DAT problem).
10 See Holland, House Panel Approves DAT Chip Bill, Billboard, August 15, 1987, at 5,
col. 5, 80, col. 1 (Copycode chip scanner would not allow DAT recorders to reproduce
"specially encoded sound recordings.").
'09 See Holland, NBS Sounds Off On Copycode, Billboard, March 12, 1988, at 1, col. 3, 70,
col. 1. (signifying end of Copycode bill).
110 See, e.g., Terry, Tensions Easing In DAT Dispute, Billboard, January 9, 1988 at 3, col. 3.
(describing system developed by Dutch hardware company which would prevent tape to
tape reproduction but allow unlimited copying from compact disc, eliminating only second
generation piracy); Terry, RIAA Chief. Many Roads Can Lead to DAT Solution, Billboard,
Feb. 27, 1988 at 3, col. 2, 82, col. 3. (suggesting possibility of "dual-inventory" strategies
where compact discs and/or digital tapes would carry two prices according to their
capabilities).
... See Dupler, RIAA Letter Reenforces Its Threat On DAT, Billboard, June 11, 1988, at 1,
col. 5. It has been noted, however, that to win a contributory infringement case such as
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mitted that the introduction of the system is inevitable.
IV. CABLE AND SATELLITES: TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION
SUCCESSFULLY CODIFIED
A major problem facing the cable and satellite television indus-
try is the theft of services."' Network operators use various tech-
nologies to transmit signals to their viewers,1 13 which leaves pro-
gramming susceptible to piracy. 1 4 The Copyright Act creates
certain rights and protections for program developers,1 5 but it is
lacking in protection and probably inappropriate for cable televi-
sion providers. 16
Thus, as a means of protecting their interest in programming,
this, particularly after Sony, will be difficult. See Id. at 90, col. 4 (opinion of Elizabeth Gran-
ville, N.Y. copyright attorney).
"' See OTA, supra note 1, at 105 ("unauthorized connection to a cable service is a major
problem") See also G.R. Roberts, Pirating Signals of Blacked Out Sports Events: A Historical
and Policy Perspective, 11 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 303 passim (1987) (discussing ease with which
cable transmissions are pirated); Note, Telecommunications Pirates America's Newest
Criminals?, 2 ENT. SP. L.J. 167, 171-73 (1985) (same).
11 See OTA supra note 1, at 105-106. Cable television uses a tall antenna and retransmits
television signals by wire to its subscribers. Id. Similarly, multipoint distribution services
(MDS) and "over the air" subscription television (STV) relay television signals through the
use of radio signals. Id. Subscribers must have a down converter and a special antenna to
receive the signals. Id. Satellite Master Antennae Television (SMATV) uses geosynchro-
nous communication relay satellites to transmit their signals. Id. at 106. The technology
allows anyone who owns a satellite dish and a down converter to access programming. Id.
See generally M. Botein, New Video Technologies in The United States: Regulatory and Intellectual
Property Considerations, 1985 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROrr D'AUTEUR, 67, 73-77 (Fall
1985) ("[B]rief description" of video technologies).
114 See, e.g., California Satellite Systems v. Seimon, 767 F.2d 1364, 1364 (9th Cir. 1985).
The plaintiff CALSAT was a provider of subscription television. Id. at 1365. CALSAT did
not scramble its signal, but it provided its customers with the equipment required to re-
ceive its signal and charged a monthly subscription fee for the service. Id. The defendant
bought microwave receiving equipment from another company and watched CALSAT's
programming without paying a subscription fee. Id. See also supra notes 8-9 (cable and sat-
ellite piracy in other contexts).
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1978 & Supp. 1988) (exempting certain performance and dis-
plays from copyright infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 111 (provision for when secondary trans-
missions of a primary transmission constitutes a copyright infringement); § 510 (providing
remedies for when cable systems alter programming content); 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-10 (deal
with royalty tribunal). See generally Note, Copyright Law: Is it Fair to Allow the Manufacture,
Sale, or Advertisement of Equipment that Permits the Interception of Cable Television Programs?
Home Box Office, Inc., v. Advanced Consumer Technology, Movie Antennae, Inc., 11 T.
MARSHALL L.J. 201 (1985) (need to define and clarify copyright laws with respect to elec-
tronic media).
"' See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for copyright
protection).
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some network operators encrypt or scramble117 their signal so that
a consumer cannot view it without a decoder box."1 The scram-
bling technique, however, has been circumvented by companies
which build and market decoding equipment enabling television
viewers to watch programs without paying the subscription fee. 1 9
In this respect the problem is analogous to that in the computer
and recording industries. Unlike those industries, however, a sym-
biosis between legal and technological copyprotection for cable
television is created in the Communications Policy Act of 1984
(Cable Act).'20 Section 605 of the Cable Act is applied to prevent
unauthorized viewing of encrypted programming. 2'
Prior to 1984, section 605 of the Communications Act did not
specifically address unauthorized descrambling of programming,
but the courts interpreted the Act to proscribe reception of trans-
missions not intended for the general public without payment of
the subscription fee. 22 In 1984, any doubt surrounding the Act's
restriction on unauthorized viewing was ended when Congress
amended section 605 to make explicit the prohibition against the
decoding or unscrambling of "encrypted" transmissions so long as
a marketing system is established. 2 Thus, a balance was struck
117 See OTA supra note 1, at 118 (scrambling or encryption is method of altering signals
so they can only be viewed with decoder device at receiving end of transmission).
118 See OTA supra note 1, at 105.
1M9 Id.
110 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-701 (1984).
... See Note, Movie Systems, Inc. v. Heller: The Unauthorized Interception of Subscription
Television, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1984) (section 605 violation relating to televi-
sion broadcast); Cable TV and New Media Law & Finance, Application of § 705 to Blacked-
Out Games Unclear, Nov. 1986 at 3.
... See Movie Sys., Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir. 1983) (section 605 prohib-
its interception of MDS signals without authorization from MDS operator); National Sub-
scription television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981) (distribution of decod-
ing device without STV operator's permission violates section 605 of the Communications
Act); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Technology, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 14, 25
(S.D.N.Y 1981) (upholding judgment of FCC that unauthorized interception of MDS signal
violated section 605). See generally Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 121, at 1267. (argu-
ing that, although courts generally reject duty to scramble their signals, CATV companies
should be required to take reasonable steps to protect their signal).
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1981 & Supp. 1988). The bill added language that stated in perti-
nent part that no person shall intercept or receive communications unless "1) the program-
ming involved is not encrypted; and (2) (A) a marketing system is not established . . ." Id.
See F. W. Lloyd & D. M. Mayeda, Copyright Fair Use, The First Amendment, and New Commu-
nications Technologies: The Impact of Betamax, 38 FED. COMM. L. J., 59, 74; See also, NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Report 88-233, Video Program
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whereby the competing interests of the viewing public and the
program owners are satisfied. Furthermore, section 553 of the
Act prohibits the distribution of equipment solely for the unau-
thorized interception of cable television transmissions." 4 The Act
is of interest because it recognizes and legitimizes the use of tech-
nological copyprotection for cable television operators. 25 No such
protection exists for the computer industry.
V. COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION: MISCELLANEOUS
SAFEGUARDS IN THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
In 1977, a survey of contract software developers found that
the protection of proprietary rights in software was not a major
concern of a majority of these software developers. 2 However,
with respect to micro-computers and mass-marketed software, the
need for protection was more evident. 2 7 The legislative response
Distribution and Cable Television: Current Policy Issues and Recommendations, U.S. Department
of Commerce, June 1988. "In addressing the challenge posed by the new technology of
satellite distribution of video programming, in 1984 the Congress established a compre-
hensive scheme to balance the rights of copyright owners with the needs of satellite dish
viewers." Id. at 111. Congress could have simply outlawed home satellite dishes, but in-
stead, it approved the idea of program owners scrambling their programming. Id. The law
grants the right to receive unencrypted signals, but makes pirating encrypted signals ille-
gal. Id.
13 47 U.S.C. § 553 (a) (1) (1988). "No person shall intercept or receive or assist in inter-
cepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifi-
cally authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized
by law." Id.
15 See National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)
(affirming injunction against several St. Louis tavern owners from using satellite receivers
to show blacked-out St. Louis Cardinals home games); ON/TV of Chicago v. Julien, 763
F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1985) (court applied section 605 to enjoin electronics company from
selling decoder kits that enabled people to pirate ON/TV's signal); United States v. Beale,
681 F. Supp. 74, 76-77 (D. Maine 1988) (section 605 used to enjoin sale of decoder boxes).
"I F.W. NIETZKE, A SOFTWARE LAW PRiMER, 26 (1984). The survey found that the follow-
ing forms of protection were used by contract software developers:
cryptographic coding 0.4%




Id. Physical, technological and contractual devices were the most popular form of
copyprotection. Id.; G. DAVIS, SOFTWARE PROTECTION PRACTICAL AND LEGAL STEPS TO PRO-
TECT AND MARKET PROGRAMS 3-4 (1985) (describing "web" of software protection).
"- Id. See DAVIS, supra note 126 (protecting economic value of software has become of
paramount importance). See also supra CONTU, note 53, at 9. The first commercial com-
puters were so expensive that only the government could afford to own them. Id. Today,
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came in the form of the 1976 and 1980 amendments to the Copy-
right Act." 8 As indicated, section 117 has achieved limited suc-
cess.' 2 9 Since these amendments, several legislative proposals have
been introduced to improve legal protection for computer pro-
grams, including an attempt to repeal section 117.1° The Com-
puter Software Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments of 1984
would have created severe criminal penalties for software
piracy.' 3 ' The Software Rental Act was proposed in 198732 and
again in 1988.183 These proposals have yet to be passed, leaving
intact the inadequacies of legal protection for software.""
Technological protections, not unlike those utilized in the cable
television and the recording industry, are also available to the
software developer. Technological or physical protection for
software can take many forms, such as encryption, software locks,
and hardware keys. 13 5 Electronic protections can be written on the
computers are smaller and much cheaper so that individuals can own them in their homes
and offices. Id. at 10.
'" See supra notes 54 and 62 and accompanying text; Note, 17 U.S.C. § 117: Is The
Amendment To The Copyright Act Adequate To Regulate The Computer Software Market?, 7 CoM-
PUTER L.J. 227, 227 (1986) (Congress adopted CONTU's recommendations through
amendments to § 117 of the Copyright Act).
'"See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
100 See Note, supra, note 128, at 233. Legislation was considered in 1985 that would
have: 1) repealed § 117 and a software owner's right to make a backup copy; or 2) limited
archival copying to situations where there is a "bona fide need"; or 3) finally prohibited the
sale of code-breakers. Id.
"ll 27 PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 346, 346-47 (Feb. 2, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Frank) (raising penalties for software piracy to "maximum of five years imprison-
ment and or fine of $250,000").
132 133 CONG. REC. E 1743 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987) (Statement of Rep. Schroeder). The
bill would have brought computer software under the Record Rental Amendment of 1984,
P.L. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727, (1984), and require a person who wants to rent a record to
obtain prior permission from the copyright owner. Id. See also 33 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 534 (Mar. 26, 1987) (Rep. Schroeder discussed problem facing consumers
who back-up copies of software for their own protection).
'3 36 PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 409, 409 (Aug. 18, 1988) (Sen. Hatch
introduced legislation that would add section (c) to 17 U.S.C. 109, whereby computer
software would be afforded protection against unauthorized rental of program).
13 See supra notes 69-74. See generally Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Ob-
ject Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1740-1742 (1983) (arguing that copyright has evolved
into general misappropriation law for protection of intellectual labor that is capable of
extensive reproduction); Keplinger, Computer-Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EM-
ORY L. J. 483, 495-96 & n.50 (1981) (describing expansion of copyright laws to meet chang-
ing needs of society).
'31 See OTA, supra note 1, at 116 (prevention of unauthorized use of computer software
by use of "locks, scrambling and encryption"); KEET, supra note 23 at 334 (protection of
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software,"' and some manufacturers are building the programs
into the computer. 87 Currently, all of these techniques are sus-
ceptible to being decoded or broken in some way.'3 8 Moreover,
physical copyprotection may impinge upon the copy-owner's legal
right to copy a program. 3 9 As an alternative to technological pro-
tection, software developers can turn to a variety of marketing
strategies that can reduce the attractiveness of software piracy. 1' 0
For example, shrink-wrap licensing purports to define the copy-
owner's rights prior to the purchase, but since Vault, it is of ques-
tionable legal validity.' Other approaches are available, such as
hot line access providing answers to purchasers, ongoing updates
of information, information in the form of printed material and
computer software can occur either through use of "hardware protective devices" or
"software locks").
13 See supra note 126; OTA, supra note 1, at 117. "Some chip manufacturers are de-
signing computer chips with machine-readable serial numbers and decryption circuits to
help software makers more effectively control their products." Id.
"" See OTA, supra note 1, at 117. The customer would have to link up to the proprie-
tor's computer, upload the program, and pay an on-line user fee. Id. at 118. A theoretical
solution is to require a personal identifier for software access. Id.
I" See OTA, supra note 1, at 117; DAvis, supra note 126, at 327 (until infallible techno-
logical protection evolves computer industry will have to rely on law for its protection);
KEET, supra note 23, at 33 (Entire industries have developed and prospered in area of
developing software protection and decoding protection). See generally Taylor, The Copy
Protection Wars, PC, Jan. 14 1986, at 165. (describing both hardware and software copy
protection techniques).
'8 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Sony seriously weakened the concept of
"contributory infringement" thus reducing the law's capacity to prevent electronic copy
devices in the computer context. Id. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,
266-67 (5th Cir. 1988) (electronic copyprotection prevented copyowner from exercising
statutory rights). See also DAvIs, supra note 126, at 327 (most technological protections fail
because they prohibit making archival copies).
140 See KEET, supra note 23, at 33. (marketing strategies, while unable to stop copying,
can make it more attractive for individuals to become "legitimate users" of protected
software). See Thaler, supra note 61. Some software marketers have gone as far as, viewing
piracy as a market reality that can be used to create markets. Id. For example, programs
are placed on the market then later improved upon and re-released. Id. Many of those who
copied the first release will want a later release if they find they like the first one. Id.
Additional sales will result on later releases of the program as consumers find they want it
along with documentation and support. Id.
141 See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that shrink-wrap license is contract of adhesion, thus unenforceable, and any state law
purporting to uphold the shrink-wrap license is preempted to the extent it conflicts with
the rights granted by 17 U.S.C. § 117); Note, Rutgers, supra note 23, at 397 (congressional
intent behind granting certain rights to software users should not be negated by manufac-
turer's use of shrink-wrap license); Note, CoMPurER L.J., supra note 23, at 277 (shrink-wrap
licenses are contracts of adhesion, thus not enforceable); NEiTZKE, supra note 126, at 100-
01 (courts are likely to find that shrink-wrap licenses are unenforceable).
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bulletins, computer program user membership association and re-
duction in price on future program acquisitions, to discourage
software piracy.1 42 In spite of the available options, due to the lack
of adequate legal protection combined with the cost efficiency of
piracy, software theft continues. 4 s
CONCLUSION
The goal of intellectual property rights is to promote the com-
mon interest by granting monopolies to individuals. In the age of
sophisticated electronics, such a complex reconciliation is difficult
to maintain by statute alone. Indicia of the ineffectiveness of cur-
rent legal protection is abundant. Technological developments
have provided additional protection, but they either infringe on
users rights or can be defeated by other technology without legal
recourse.
Piracy of computer software occurs at a rate unprecedented in
any other product to date. Unlike audio and video recording, re-
production of computer software is highly cost efficient in terms
of actual expense and undiminished quality. Unlike cable televi-
sion, for which the theft of scrambled signals is prohibited by law,
the copying of computer software is a substantial legitimate use
under section 117.
Codification of users' rights in section 117, allowing adaptations
and the making of archival copies, while furthering some of the
interests at which it is aimed, also serves to enable substantial
piracy in a context already fraught with misapropriation. It is sug-
gested that a reevaluation of section 117 is required. However, it
is also submitted that any investigation should be accompanied by
14 See KEET, supra note 22, at 33. The Hotline access to support personnel generally
includes attaching a code number to each piece of software so that when the user needs
help from the 800 service line they must call in the code to get help. Id. Someone with a
copy of the program, but no code number cannot get help. Id. Documentation updates,
newsletters and product bulletins will contain usage tips, "work arounds" for known
problems, and tips on handling recently discovered bugs all of which maximize the value of
software. Id. Product update services such as news of and easy access to new releases in-
form the software owner when there is an improved version of his program available. Id.
Finally, natural barriers in documentation, which because of color, shape or packaging
make it difficult and expensive to copy will deter pirates. Id.
... See BESEN, supra note 12, at 13-15 & n.14 (estimates appear to have been far below
actual loss incurred as result of both private and commercial copying).
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consideration of technologies which can enhance protection and,
through codification, prohibit decoding devices. Due to the extent
of piracy in intellectual property, any additional protection will
further the purposes underlying copyright laws, and can be di-
rected specifically at the product most in need of enhanced
protection.
Christopher G. Dorman & Robert G. Miller

